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Abstract 
Rising support for populist right-wing parties has become a key story of recent decades. It has 
mainly been making headlines in Western democracies but is also becoming increasingly 
prevalent in Central and Eastern Europe. Despite there being strong evidence that campaigns 
influence electoral performance, and a large body of literature profiling the voters of populist 
right-wing parties, we still know little about the comparative relevance of parties’ campaign 
efforts and voters’ personal characteristics for supporting such parties. Merging data from the 
2015 Estonian Candidate Study and the 2015 Estonian National Election Study, this article 
explains electoral support for the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia. It finds that both 
individual-level and party-level factors influence voters’ likelihood of casting their ballot for 
the populist right-wing party. Support for the party is higher in constituencies where it carries 
out more intense campaigns, and amongst voters who hold anti-establishment sentiments and 
are socially conservative. In contrast to populist right-wing parties in the West, however, anti-
immigration feelings and Euroscepticism do not drive support for it. These findings show that 
support for populist right-wing parties is shaped by their campaign effort and their ability to 
























The growing popularity and electoral success of populist right-wing parties has been one of 
the key stories of recent decades. These parties are no longer marginalised and in the fringes 
of the society, but often leading the political discussion and credible options for casting one’s 
ballot for. They are no longer seen as parties for “fruitcakes, loonies and closet racists” (BBC 
2006), but as meaningful players in the political arena. Today, around fifty democracies have 
populist right-wing parties represented in their legislature, including such diverse countries 
like Austria, Brazil, Estonia, France, India, Germany, and Poland. It is essential to understand 
who votes for populist right-wing parties as they are playing an increasingly important role in 
shaping public discourse and legislative agenda.  
 
The relevance of populist right-wing parties in the political arena has unsurprisingly led to a 
growing number of studies profiling their voters and examining the conditions under which 
such parties succeed. Yet, this literature has given little attention to the potential relevance of 
electoral campaigns. It is widely acknowledged in the study of voting behaviour that electoral 
campaigns influence what happens on the polling day (e.g., Fisher et al. 2016; Sudulich et al. 
2013; Trumm 2016), particularly in the current political climate where party attachments are 
weak and the number of late deciders and floating voters is increasing (e.g., Dalton 2008, 
2012; Lupo 2015; McAllister 2002). The potential relevance of campaign effects, however, 
has not transferred to the study of populist right-wing voting. It is important to utilise these 
insights and capture a broader range of factors when explaining support for the populist right-
wing parties at the ballot box.  
 
This study explores the recent electoral success of the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia 
(EKRE).1 Who voted for EKRE at the 2015 parliamentary election? What is the comparative 
relevance of voters’ individual-level characteristics and EKRE’s campaign efforts in shaping 
whether someone casts her ballot for the party or not? I answer both questions using data 
from the 2015 Estonian Candidate Study and the 2015 Estonian National Election Study. The 
former allows me to capture the campaign effort put in place by EKRE candidates, and the 
latter allows me to capture voters’ individual-level characteristics like their socio-economic 
situation, cultural attitudes, and demographic background. Taken together, this paper not only 
extends our understanding of electoral support for another increasingly prominent populist 
right-wing party in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), but it also offers a first-cut evaluation 
of the comparative relevance of voters’ personal characteristics and party-level campaign 
efforts in determining who casts her ballot for a populist right-wing party and who does not. 
                                                          
1 The case study of EKRE is well-suited for extending our understanding of populist right-wing parties’ success 
in CEE. First, Estonia arguably provides the toughest test for populist right-wing parties in the region. Not only 
was it the last CEE country with weak radical right-wing movements in 2015 (Minkenberg 2017), but it had also 
resisted such movements despite the presence of factors commonly linked to the success of extreme-right parties 
(Auers and Kasekamp 2009). Second, the party remains popular amongst the public, polling as high as 22% in 
July 2018 (Kanter Emor 2018). Whereas scholars have studied EKRE’s public discourse (Kasekamp et al. 2018; 
Wierenga 2017), we still know very little about how this plays out with voters and what the key drivers for its 
electoral support are. Given that the next parliamentary election in Estonia will be held in March 2019, the latter 
is particularly important to understand. Finally, the availability of voter and candidate survey data from the 2015 
election offers a rare opportunity to simultaneously assess the role of voters’ individual-level characteristics and 




The analysis reveals that both individual-level and party-level factors influence whether 
someone casts her ballot for a populist right-wing party or not. As expected, EKRE draws its 
support disproportionately amongst voters who are socially conservative, mistrust politicians, 
and in precarious employment. EKRE is also more popular amongst men and voters who see 
Estonian as their primary identity. Individual-level factors, however, do not tell the full story. 
The findings also reveal that campaigns matter. Support for EKRE is higher in constituencies 
where its candidates put in place more intense campaign effort in the immediate run up to the 
polling day. Taken together, these findings emphasise that electoral support for populist right-
wing parties is not given. It is concentrated amongst voters with a certain personal profile, but 
it is also influenced by voters’ experiences during electoral campaigns.  
 
This article is organised as follows. The next section surveys existing literature on voting for 
populist right-wing parties. I then provide some background information on EKRE, describe 
the data and methods, and present the empirical results. The paper finishes with a discussion 
of their implications.  
 
Who supports populist right-wing parties? 
The growing prominence of populist right-wing parties has unsurprisingly led to an increased 
academic interest in understanding what influences support for these parties. Research in this 
strand has generally focused on either individual-level data on voters’ personal characteristics 
and vote choices or party-level data on populist right-wing parties’ vote share over time and 
across constituencies. Although different in their approach, there are certain demand-side and 
supply-side factors that both highlight as shaping support for populist right-wing parties. 
 
The demand-side factors, focusing on voters’ personal profile and grievances, can be divided 
into three categories. First, economic grievances can motivate support for populist right-wing 
parties. According to this theory, perceived economic inequality and social deprivation fuel a 
sense of being ‘left behind’, resulting in resentment towards the political elite which, in turn, 
leads to the appeal of populist right-wing parties’ anti-establishment message and blaming of 
an outgroup for one’s economic struggles. As such, support for populist right-wing parties is 
expected to be higher amongst voters in insecure and low-paid employment, and those who 
are more pessimistic about the state of the economy (e.g., Arzheimer 2009; Cutts et al. 2011; 
Goodwin and Harris 2013).2 Second, support for populist right-wing parties can be seen as a 
cultural backlash against progressive change. The rise in liberal values, multiculturalism, and 
general openness of societies to outsiders has led to a sense of decline amongst some voters 
who resent the rising tide of progressive liberal values and the changing nature of societies, 
making them more receptive to the appeal of populist right-wing parties. As such, support for 
populist right-wing parties is seen to be higher amongst voters who are anti-immigration and 
Eurosceptic, socially conservative, and generally mistrustful towards the political elite (e.g., 
Allen 2017b; Ford et al. 2012; Oesch 2008; van Elsas 2017). Finally, demographic profile of 
                                                          
2 Although the ‘left behind’ thesis is dominant, some scholars have found economic indicators to have either no 
effect or a negative effect on support for right-wing parties (Coffé et al. 2007; Lubbers and Scheepers 2002). 
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voters has been shown to matter. The main characteristics that studies have highlighted here 
are gender, age, education, and national identity (e.g., Allen 2017a; Ford and Goodwin 2010; 
Rooduijn et al. 2017). 
  
Existing studies of populist right-wing parties have also shown that there is some variation in 
the extent to which they tap into the different grievances in Eastern and Western Europe, and 
the nature of their discourse more broadly. On the one hand, populist right-wing parties in the 
two regions tend to frame different groups as the ‘others’. Whereas immigrants take the role 
of scapegoats for resentment and are the core element in the political agenda for the populist 
right-wing parties in Western Europe, it is national minorities and neighbouring countries that 
are the main targets for such parties in Eastern Europe (e.g., Minkenberg 2013, 2017; Pytlas 
2017). Immigration has simply not been, at least in the past, a salient social or political issue 
in the latter. Therefore, anti-immigration sentiments should provide a stronger cue for voting 
for populist right-wing parties in Western Europe, whereas being part of the majority versus 
minority group should play a more important role in Eastern Europe. On the other hand, the 
general discourse of populist right-wing parties in Eastern Europe tends to be more extreme 
and anti-democratic than that of their Western European counterparts. The political space that 
populist right-wing parties in Eastern Europe can operate in is more limited as mainstream 
parties in the region have traditionally been willing to adopt aspects of radical right ideology 
(e.g., Minkenberg 2002, 2013; Pytlas 2017). This suggests that voters of populist right-wing 
parties in Eastern European should be particularly dissatisfied with the existing political elite. 
 
The supply-side factors, focusing on political opportunity structures and mobilising strategies 
of parties, emphasise the importance of how open a political system is to political newcomers 
in understanding where populist right-wing parties succeed (Arzheimer and Carter 2006). It is 
argued that the rise and success of populist right-wing parties is more likely in countries with 
proportional electoral systems (Norris 2005), media that is willing to give them a profile and 
cover issues that they want highlighted (Boomgarden and Vliegenthart 2007; Ellinas 2010), 
historical legacies that have given voters reasons to be sceptical of politicians (de Lange and 
Guerra 2009), and a political space they can operate in (Meguid 2005). Besides the political 
opportunity structures, the choices that populist right-wing parties make also matter. They 
benefit from building an effective party organisation (Art 2011; Carter 2005) and choosing a 
charismatic leader (Pauwels 2010). These factors, albeit important to understanding why 
support for populist right-wing parties varies across countries and elections, are not included 
in this study as they do not vary in the context of a single election. 
 
Despite research on the voters of populist right-wing parties having become a minor industry, 
it still has limitations. On the one hand, this literature has predominantly focused on Western 
Europe. Although there is a growing body of studies that examine the nature of populist right-
wing parties in Eastern Europe (e.g., Bustikova and Kitschelt 2009; Minkenberg 2013, 2017; 
Pytlas 2017), our understanding of which voters end up voting for populist right-wing parties 
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is much more sporadic for Eastern Europe than it is for Western Europe.3 This is emphasised 
in the case of the Baltic States as no study to date, to the best of my knowledge, has examined 
the recent electoral success of EKRE.4 Whereas this does not of course mean that the patterns 
of support for populist right-wing parties are necessarily unique in Eastern Europe or Estonia, 
it is important to extend our understanding of who supports such parties in the region. On the 
other hand, literature on electoral support for populist right-wing parties fails to account what 
is widely recognised in voting behaviour literature; campaigns matter (e.g., Fisher et al. 2016; 
Sudulich et al. 2013; Trumm 2016).5 We live in an era where party loyalties are weakening, 
the number of late deciders and floating voters is rising, and issue voting is on the up (e.g., 
Dalton 2008, 2012; Lupo 2015; McAllister 2002). What happens in the immediate run up to 
the polling day is increasingly important in determining what party someone ultimately casts 
her ballot for. Yet, the campaign effects associated with voting for populist right-wing parties 
are largely overlooked.6 It is, therefore, important to build on existing literature and examine 
how important populist right-wing parties’ campaign efforts are in influencing who votes for 
them, in absolute terms as well as relative to the importance of the different individual-level 
factors that have been shown to play a role.  
 
This study addresses both limitations. It compares the importance of voters’ individual-level 
characteristics and party-level campaign efforts in determining whether someone votes for a 
populist right-wing party or not, focusing on a CEE country as a case study.  
 
The emergence of EKRE 
EKRE is a relatively new party in Estonia’s political landscape. It was established in March 
2012 as a result of the merger between the Estonian Nationalist Movement and the People’s 
Union of Estonia. This was effectively a marriage of a social movement and a political party. 
The newly-formed EKRE had several things going for it. The party did not have to start from 
scratch as it inherited the organisation and network of the People’s Union of Estonia, it had a 
degree of automatic credibility as the People’s Union of Estonia had served in government, it 
inherited Arnold Rüütel (former president of Estonia) as the honorary chairman from the 
People’s Union of Estonia, and has had a charismatic and media-savvy leader in Mart Helme 
since its early days.7 
 
                                                          
3 Recent studies by Allen (2017a), Bustikova (2014), de Lange and Guerra (2009), and Pirro (2014) are notable 
exceptions that do profile voters of populist right-wing parties in Eastern Europe. 
4 Existing studies of populist far-right in Estonia have focused on explaining the failure of this movement in the 
past (Auers and Kasekamp 2009), its nature and evolution (Auers and Kasekamp 2013, 2015), and the discourse 
and political stance of EKRE (Kasekamp et al. 2018; Wierenga 2017). 
5 The mechanisms through which campaigns influence voting are plentiful. They can raise voters’ awareness of 
candidates and issues that are relevant to voting calculus (Jacobson 2013; Fridkin and Kenney 2011a). They can 
inform voters about candidates’ qualifications, issue positions, etc., raise awareness of political conditions, and, 
crucially, prime voters to attach greatest electoral relevance to traits and issues where candidates believe to have 
an electoral advantage (Hillygus 2010). In addition, attacks on opposition can be memorable and influence the 
support for the target and the attacker (Lau et al. 2007), especially if they are focusing on topics that are relevant 
to governing and disseminated in an uncivil manner (Fridkin and Kenney 2011b). 
6 The notable exception is the study by Cutts and Goodwin (2014) that examines support for the British National 
Party at the 2010 British general election. 
7 For recent studies on EKRE, see Auers and Kasekamp (2015), Kasekamp et al. (2018), and Wierenga (2017). 
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The political discourse that EKRE promotes is quite common to populist right-wing parties in 
CEE. It describes itself as a patriotic party whose main mission is to protect Estonian national 
values and interests (EKRE 2018). In a recent study of EKRE’s media discourse, Kasekamp 
and others (2018) identified four key narratives in its political communication: an anti-Russia 
stance, Euroscepticism, promotion of family values, and anti-refugee sentiment.8 In terms of 
the party’s communication style and image, EKRE opposes mainstream media and political 
correctness, and it tries to present itself as a new political force (Auers and Kasekamp 2015; 
Kasekamp et al. 2018). EKRE is an openly nationalist, socially-conservative party that uses 
cruder public discourse to engage with voters. 
 
The electoral breakthrough of EKRE came at the 2015 parliamentary election and took many 
by surprise. Whereas party systems in CEE are remarkably unstable and volatile (Powell and 
Tucker 2014; Savage 2016), Estonian party system was quite consolidated by 2015, with the 
number parliamentary parties having decreased to just four after the 2011 election. Moreover, 
extreme right-wing movements had been electorally unsuccessful in the country for decades, 
despite the presence of factors often linked to their success (Auers and Kasekamp 2009), and 
EKRE itself only managed to gain 1.3% of the popular vote at the 2013 local elections. There 
was little to indicate that EKRE goes on to win 8.1% of the popular vote and seven seats (out 
of 101) at the 2015 parliamentary election.9 
 
Data and methods 
The analyses presented here rely on survey data from the 2015 Estonian Candidate Study and 
the voter study component of the 2015 Estonian National Election Study. These surveys are 
ideally suited for capturing the electoral choices and personal characteristics of voters as well 
as the campaign effort put in place by EKRE candidates. They were conducted close together, 
have an extensive reach in terms of the number of respondents, and ask voters and candidates 
about their actual electoral behaviour at the 2015 parliamentary election. 
 
The voter study component of the 2015 Estonian National Election Study is used to capture 
voters’ electoral choices and personal characteristics. The survey asked voters which party (if 
any) they cast their ballot for at the 2015 parliamentary election, about their socio-economic 
situation, cultural attitudes, demographic background, etc. It was carried out by Saar Poll, for 
the University of Tartu, in March 2015. It is ideal for capturing voters’ electoral choices and 
personal characteristics, being the most far-reaching survey that has been recently conducted 
in Estonia in terms of the number of respondents and range of pertinent questions, and asking 
voters about their actual, not hypothetical, voting choices. 
 
The 2015 Estonian Candidate Study is a post-election survey of candidates who stood at the 
2015 parliamentary election, carried out in March and April 2015. The final sample includes 
394 candidates (45.2% of all candidates) and is highly representative of the full population of 
                                                          
8 EKRE is open to Russian-speakers becoming members, but only if they are Estonian nationalists who adhere 
to the party’s constitution and see Estonia as a sovereign nation which they seek to protect Wierenga (2017). 
9 See Appendix A for information on EKRE’s electoral performance by constituency and its electoral platform. 
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candidates. When using the Duncan index of dissimilarity to compare the distribution of two 
key characteristics – partisanship and constituency – in the sample and the full population, it 
yields values of 0.06 and 0.07, respectively.10 Moreover, the proportion of women in the full 
population and the sample is equal at 27%, whereas the average age is similar (51 versus 50 
years) and so is the proportion of successful candidates (8.4% versus 11.6%). Data from the 
2015 Estonian Candidate Study are used to capture the campaign effort of EKRE candidates 
and the extent to which they were embedded in the community they stood for election in.11 
 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable in this study is EKRE vote. It is a straightforward indicator of whether 
a respondent cast her ballot for EKRE (coded 1) or not (coded 0).12 Recalled voting choice is 
a widely used indicator in voting behaviour literature to capture support for a particular party 
as it is, or at least could be, influenced by electoral campaigns (e.g., Allen 2017a; Rooduijn et 
al. 2017; Rydgren 2008). Therefore, it is well suited to simultaneously account for any effects 
associated with voters’ individual-level characteristics as well as parties’ electoral campaigns. 
 
Explanatory characteristics 
In line with the theoretical framework, four sets of explanatory characteristics are included in 
the study. First, measures of the cultural dimension are captured. Anti-immigration describes 
respondent’s attitude towards a liberal immigration policy. It is operationalised as the extent 
to which a respondent agrees with the claim that ‘obtaining Estonian citizenship should be 
made easier’, ranging from 1 ‘completely agree’ to 4 ‘completely disagree’. Euroscepticism 
captures respondent’s attitude towards European integration. It is measured on a scale from 0 
‘integration should be pushed further’ to 10 ‘integration has gone too far’. These indicators 
tap into the prevalence of the ‘us versus them’ attitude and how important voters believe that 
the protectionism of the status quo is. Moving on, social conservatism describes how liberal 
versus conservative the respondent is. It is operationalised as the extent to which she agrees 
with the statement that ‘legalising same sex marriage was a right decision’, ranging from 1 
‘completely agree’ to 4 ‘completely disagree’. Finally, political mistrust captures how much 
the respondent trusts politicians as a group. It ranges from 0 ‘complete trust’ 10 ‘no trust’. In 
line with existing evidence, I expect higher likelihood of voting for EKRE amongst voters 
who oppose a liberal immigration policy, are Eurosceptic, socially conservative, and mistrust 
politicians. 
 
                                                          
10 See Appendix B for additional information on the survey sample, and Duncan and Duncan (1955) for further 
information on the Duncan index of dissimilarity. 
11 Candidate survey data have various advantages over official spending data and voter survey data for capturing 
campaign effects. On the one hand, campaign regulation in Estonia is unrestrictive (Erakondade Rahastamise 
Järelvalve Komisjon 2018). In addition to having no legally defined campaign period, parties are not required to 
declare their election spending on constituency-level, and the election spending reports filed by candidates only 
need to include expenditure funded with personal money. On the other hand, the voter survey that was carried 
out in 2015 did not ask respondents about party contact. As such, candidate survey data are preferred. It asked 
respondents about their overall campaign expenditure and whether they reside in the constituency they stood for 
election in, allowing for the creation of constituency-level indicators that tap into the campaign profile of EKRE 
candidates. 
12 Respondents who did not vote at the 2015 parliamentary election are not included in the analysis. 
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Next, indicators of the economic dimension are included in the study. Economic pessimism 
captures how positively (or negatively) the respondent thinks of Estonia’s economic situation. 
It is operationalised as her view on how Estonia’s economy has performed in the last twelve 
months, ranging from 1 ‘got much better’ to 4’ got a lot worse’. Employment type describes 
the respondent’s own employment situation. It distinguishes between respondents in full time 
employment (coded 1), in part time employment working 19-40 hours weekly (coded 2), in 
limited employment working 1-19 hours weekly (coded 3), receiving irregular income from 
working (coded 4), unemployed (coded 5), and receiving state benefits (coded 6). Given that 
support for populist right-wing parties is associated with economic insecurity, I expect voting 
for EKRE to be more likely amongst voters who display greater level of economic pessimism 
and who are in more precarious types of employment. 
 
Third, the analysis controls for respondents’ demographic profile. Age captures respondents’ 
age at the time of the election. The age groups are as follows: 1 ’18-24 years old’, 2 ’25-34 
years old’, 3 ’35-44 years old’, 4 ’45-54 years old’, 5 ’55-64 years old’, 6 ’65-74 years old’, 
and 7 ‘75+ years old’. The existing evidence here is mixed. Whereas most studies of populist 
right-wing vote have found it to be higher amongst younger voters (Allen 2017a; Arzheimer 
2011; van Elsas 2017), some have found the opposite (Ford et al. 2012; Inglehart and Norris 
2016). I expect to find the latter in Estonia. Party attachment in Estonia is weak amongst the 
younger and older voters which makes them both open to switching to EKRE, but the profile 
of the party chairman Mart Helme as a former high-level diplomat in 1990s is more likely to 
be known amongst the latter. Gender is captured as a dichotomous variable, with males coded 
as 0 and females as 1. Education captures the respondent’s highest level of qualification. It 
distinguishes between respondents who have finished primary education (coded 1), secondary 
education (coded 2), and higher education (coded 3). Identity captures whether the respondent 
considers herself to be Estonian (coded 1) or not (coded 0).13 I expect support for EKRE to be 
higher amongst men, older voters, the less well educated, and those who see Estonian as their 
primary identity. 
 
Finally, two indicators of voters’ campaign experience are included in the study. It is widely 
shown in voting behaviour literature that electoral support for parties and candidates is linked 
to their campaign effort, incumbency, and locality. Incumbency is not used here as all EKRE 
candidates were challengers. Campaign effort and locality of EKRE candidates, however, are 
included as they varied considerably across constituencies. Campaign effort captures the level 
of campaign intensity that EKRE candidates put forward in the run up to the polling day. It is 
operationalised as the average campaign expenditure of EKRE candidates in the respondent’s 
constituency. Locality captures the embeddedness of EKRE candidates in the community that 
they stand for election. It is measured as the per cent of EKRE candidates in the respondent’s 
constituency who live in that constituency, ranging from 0 ‘none’ to 100 ‘all’. Both measures 
are obtained from the 2105 Estonian Candidate Study. In line with existing evidence, I expect 
both indicators to positively influence voters’ likelihood of casting their ballot for EKRE. 
 
                                                          




The potential effects of the explanatory variables on voting for EKRE are evaluated using a 
logistic regression model with penalised maximum likelihood estimation. Logistic regression 
is used given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, whereas penalised maximum 
likelihood estimation is preferred given the rare occurrence of voting for EKRE. Although the 
party won 8.1% of the popular vote, it still constitutes a small minority and a rare event from 
the estimation point of view. Penalised maximum likelihood estimation, also known as Firth 
method, is the appropriate technique to model the occurrence of such events.14 
 
Explaining electoral support for EKRE 
The focus is now turned to exploring which explanatory factors have a systematic effect on 
voting for EKRE. Table 1 presents findings from the multivariate logistic regression.  
 
It is evident that support for EKRE cannot be explained with any one or two characteristics. It 
is a function of a complex combination of factors, some related to voters’ personal profile and 
beliefs but not all. First, focusing on the demographic indicators, two have a significant effect 
on voting for EKRE. The negative coefficient of -0.61 for gender reveals that women are less 
likely to vote for EKRE than men, whereas the positive coefficient of 3.50 for identity shows 
that those who see Estonian as their primary identity are significantly more likely to cast their 
ballot for EKRE than voters who do not.15 Both findings follow the theoretical expectations. I 
do not, however, find a significant effect associated with education or age. This suggests that 
electoral support for EKRE is not disproportionately higher amongst the older voters or those 
with lower educational qualifications. It is men and those whose primary identity is Estonian 
who are more inclined to vote for EKRE. 
 
Second, the findings regarding the cultural and economic factors are intriguing. Note first that 
the decision to vote for EKRE does not appear to be driven by Euroscepticism or opposition 
to a liberal immigration policy, which are often considered key reasons for voting for populist 
right-wing parties. The effects associated with anti-immigration and Euroscepticism are in the 
expected direction, but neither reach the conventional level of statistical significance.16 There 
                                                          
14 See, for example, Firth (1993) or Williams (2017) for additional information on using logistic regression with 
penalised maximum likelihood estimation when analysing rare events. 
15 The significant effect for identity primarily reveals a difference in EKRE support amongst voters who think of 
themselves as Estonian versus Russian, given that the vast majority (86%) of respondents who do not identify as 
Estonians see themselves as Russians. This finding also suggests that anti-Russian rhetoric and nativism towards 
the Russian-speaking population, both key themes for the populist radical-right in Estonia (Auers and Kasekamp 
2013; Kasekamp et al. 2018), has resonated with voters and become key for EKRE’s electoral appeal. In a wider 
context, it is another example of national minorities, instead of immigrants, being assigned the role of ‘others’ in 
CEE (Minkenberg 2017). 
16 The non-significance of Euroscepticism and opposition to a liberal immigration policy are surprising as both 
are key themes in EKRE’s political messages (Kasekamp et al. 2018). It is most likely explained by the fact that 
these themes, albeit important to EKRE’s discourse, were not central to the voting calculus of many voters. On 
the one hand, Estonia is very positive about the European Union. Eurobarometer 82 was the last of such surveys 
conducted before the 2015 parliamentary election and shows Estonia as one of the most positive countries about 
the European Union, with only 7% of respondents having a negative image of it (European Commission 2014). 
The political opportunity for priming Euroscepticism as the key issue that voters should base their voting choice 
on was not there in spring 2015. On the other hand, the saliency of immigration was also low. Only 5% of the 
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is, however, evidence that negativity and dissatisfaction drives support for EKRE. In terms of 
negativity, the outgroup it is targeted against is simply not immigrants or the European Union 
but politicians. The positive coefficient of 0.16 shows that voters who are more mistrustful of 
politicians as a group are also more inclined to cast their ballot for EKRE. This is in line with 
the theoretical expectations and makes sense given the party’s anti-establishment rhetoric and 
efforts to portray itself as a new political force (Auers and Kasekamp 2015). In addition, the 
extent to which someone holds socially liberal or conservative attitudes matters. The positive 
coefficient of 0.52 indicates that the more socially conservative the voter is, the more inclined 
she is to vote for EKRE. Again, given the party’s emphasis on the promotion of family values 
and salient stance against the legalisation of same-sex marriage (Auers and Kasekamp 2015; 
Kasekamp et al. 2018), it is unsurprising that voters who are socially conservative have been 
able to identify EKRE as the party which their attitudes align with most. Finally, employment 
type matters to some degree. The positive coefficient of 1.48 means that those in very limited 
employment – i.e., working 1-19 hours weekly – are more likely to cast their ballot for EKRE 
than those who are in full time employment. There are no significant effects associated with 
other employment types or with economic pessimism. It is voters who are active in the labour 
market and in paid employment, but have very restricted working hours and limited earnings, 
who are particularly likely to vote for EKRE. These findings lend support to the idea that the 
cultural and economic dimensions are both relevant to understanding electoral support for the 
party. 
 
Finally, the evidence further highlights the importance of focusing on voters’ individual-level 
characteristics as well as party-level campaign dynamics when exploring electoral support for 
EKRE. I do not find evidence that the proportion of local candidates put forward by EKRE in 
the constituency impacts voter’s likelihood of casting her ballot for the party, but the intensity 
of EKRE’s constituency-level campaign effort is clearly relevant to understanding who votes 
for the party. The positive coefficient of 0.56 implies that the more intense campaigns EKRE 
candidates put in place in voter’s constituency, the more likely she is to cast her ballot for the 
party. Campaign effort influences electoral support for the party even after controlling for all 
the individual-level characteristics. This implies that support for populist right-wing parties is 
not given, based on voters’ personal profile and attitudes, but needs to be fought for. It is vital 
for parties like EKRE not only to identify their potential voters and have messages that would 
resonate with them, but also to undertake extensive campaign efforts so that voters have the 
knowledge and awareness to identify them as the parties of their choice.  
 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
To provide further real-world meaning of the findings and compare the effect sizes associated 
with the independent variables, Table 2 presents the predicted values for voters’ likelihood of 
casting their ballot for EKRE. For each effect, the particular characteristic varies as others are 
held constant at their mean. 
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The comparison of effect sizes further highlights that support for EKRE is multifaceted. The 
strongest effect is associated with employment type as voters in limited employment are a lot 
more likely to vote for EKRE than voters in full time employment (28.4% versus 9.7%). The 
effects associated with the other factors are slightly smaller, but still highly relevant. In terms 
of the cultural dimension, voters who mistrust politicians are 11.5% more likely to vote for 
EKRE than those who trust politicians (15.5% versus 4.0%), and socially conservative voters 
are 9.3% more likely to cast their ballot for EKRE than those who are socially liberal (12.6% 
versus 3.3%). In terms of the demographic indicators, the effect associated with identity is of 
a similar size as those who identity as Estonians are 11.4% more likely to vote for EKRE than 
those who do not (11.9% versus 0.5%), but gender carries a weaker effect with it as men are 
only 4.8% more likely to vote for EKRE than women (12.4% versus 7.6%). These individual-
level characteristics are clearly relevant to understanding who votes for EKRE and who does 
not, but so is campaign effort. The minimum-to-maximum shift in campaign effort results in 
an effect on EKRE vote that is of a similar size to those associated with most individual-level 
characteristics. Voters are more likely to vote for EKRE when the intensity of its candidates’ 
campaign effort in their constituency is higher. The likelihood of voting for EKRE increases 
by 9.7% when comparing voters in constituencies where EKRE candidates’ average spend is 
€0 (6.7%) and €2,000 (16.4%). It is evident that certain voters, in terms of their own personal 
characteristics, are more receptive to the party than others, but it is also the level of campaign 
effort put in place by its candidates that shapes its electoral fortunes.  
 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
Conclusions 
The popularity of populist right-wing parties has been one of the key success stories of recent 
times. Amid concerns about immigration and economic inequality, Euroscepticism, mistrust 
of politicians, and a sense of lost national identity amongst some, these parties have been able 
to win support in opinion polls and make electoral gains in many Western European and CEE 
countries. The parliamentary election of 2015 saw Estonia added to that list as EKRE gained 
seven seats in the Estonian parliament with 8.1% of the popular vote.  
 
This study explores the relevance of different types of factors in understanding who votes for 
EKRE. Despite there being strong evidence that campaigns influence electoral outcomes and 
a large body of literature profiling populist right-wing voters, we still know very little about 
the comparative relevance of voters’ personal characteristics and parties’ campaign strategies 
for supporting parties like EKRE. Combining survey data from the 2015 Estonian Candidate 
Study and the 2015 Estonian National Election Study, this study pulls together insights from 
these two strands of literature. It finds that both individual-level and party-level factors shape 
voters’ likelihood of voting for EKRE. Support for the party is higher in constituencies where 
its candidates undertake more intense campaigns, as well as amongst voters who are socially 
conservative, mistrust politicians, in limited employment, consider Estonian as their primary 
identity, and male. Interestingly, the effect associated with candidates’ campaign effort is of a 
similar size to those associated with voters’ individual-level characteristics. Taken together, it 
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is apparent that electoral support for populist right-wing parties is multifaceted. It is linked to 
voters’ personal profile, but also to the intensity of the campaign effort put in place by these 
parties in the immediate run up to the polling day. 
 
There are three broader points arising from this study and its findings. First, the fact that both 
individual-level and party-level characteristics influence who votes for EKRE highlights the 
importance of giving more attention to what happens in the immediate run up to the polling 
day when explaining electoral support for populist right-wing parties. Literature on voting for 
populist right-wing parties, whether focusing on individual-level vote choice or constituency-
level vote share, has tended to explain this using either voters’ individual-level characteristics 
like their demographic profile or contextual factors like issue ownership. Whereas both types 
of explanations are of course relevant and have been proven to matter, they fail to account for 
the potential importance of parties’ electoral campaigns. It is widely acknowledged that party 
attachments are weakening amongst electorates and the number of late deciders is increasing. 
The evidence provided here lends further support to the idea that studies of electoral support 
for populist right-wing parties should extend their reach and simultaneously evaluate the role 
played in this by voters’ individual-level characteristics and party-level campaign efforts. 
 
Second, the findings indicate that populist right-wing parties need to be strategic about which 
resentment they should tap into to enhance their electoral appeal. EKRE’s political discourse, 
as that of most parties, focused on multiple themes around the time of the 2015 parliamentary 
election (Kasekamp et al. 2018), but some were more influential than others in determining 
whether voters ultimately cast their ballot for an EKRE candidate or not. Whereas mistrust of 
the political establishment was a key driver of electoral support for EKRE, as was opposition 
to the adoption of socially liberal policies, Euroscepticism and anti-immigration feelings were 
not. This is not to say that the latter attitudes were not shared by supporters of EKRE, but that 
they were simply not as electorally relevant in the context of the 2015 parliamentary election 
as the previously mentioned resentments. The findings presented here suggest that electoral 
support for populist right-wing parties is influenced by their ability to tap into the ‘right’ kind 
of disillusionment when choosing their public discourse.  
 
Finally, the findings further emphasise that there is considerable variation within the group of 
populist right-wing parties. In particular, they lend support to the idea that populist right-wing 
parties and their support base differ between Eastern and Western Europe (e.g., Allen 2017b; 
Minkenberg 2017; Pytlas 2017). Whereas immigrants tend to take on the role of scapegoats 
for resentment and be the primary target for populist right-wing parties and voters in Western 
Europe, ethnic minorities are seen to take on that role in Eastern Europe. The findings shown 
here support this thesis. Whereas anti-immigration sentiments were not key drivers for EKRE 
support at the 2015 parliamentary election, voters’ self-perceived identity was important in 
understanding who voted for the party and who did not. Electoral support for the party was 
considerably higher amongst voters whose primary identity was Estonian than those who saw 
themselves as members of an ethnic minority first and foremost. This lends further support to 




Appendix A. EKRE and the 2015 parliamentary election 
EKRE’s electoral campaign in the run up to the 2015 parliamentary election had an explicitly 
nationalistic undertone (EKRE 2014). For example, the party promised to fight against mass 
migration into Estonia, advocated direct democracy, called for the removal of signatures from 
the 2014 border treaty between Estonia and Russia, emphasised the need to enhance Estonia’s 
defence capability, etc. Campaign messages such as these clearly resonated with a substantial 
minority of Estonian voters.  
 
Table A1 presents the electoral results for EKRE at the 2015 parliamentary election, showing 
the number of valid votes cast for the party and its vote share in each constituency. 
 
Table A1. Electoral support for EKRE by constituency 
Constituency EKRE vote EKRE vote share (%) 
1. Tallinn: Haabersti, Põhja-Tallinn, Kristiine 2,986 5.3 
2. Tallinn: Kesklinn, Lasnamäe, Pirita 3,396 4.6 
3. Tallinn: Mustamäe, Nõmme 4,570 8.8 
4. Harjumaa (exc. Tallinn), Raplamaa 7,050 8.0 
5. Hiiumaa, Läänemaa, Saaremaa 3,770 11.2 
6. Lääne-Virumaa 2,492 9.3 
7. Ida-Virumaa 1,068 3.1 
8. Järvamaa, Viljandimaa 3,054 7.9 
9. Jõgevamaa, Tartumaa (exc. Tartu) 3,814 9.3 
10. Tartu 3,109 6.9 
11. Võrumaa, Valgamaa, Põlvamaa 4,275 9.6 
12. Pärnumaa 7,188 18.2 






















Appendix B. The 2015 Estonian Candidate Study 
The 2015 Estonian Candidate Study includes 394 candidates who disclosed their partisanship 
and constituency they stood for election in. The detailed breakdown is presented in Table B1.  
 
Table B1. The 2015 Estonian Candidate Study sample 
  Candidates (%) Sample (%) 
Partisanship   
Conservative People’s Party of Estonia 14.3 15.0 
Estonian Centre Party 14.3 11.9 
Estonian Greens 4.6 5.1 
Estonian Independence Party 1.3 1.0 
Estonian Reform Party 14.2 14.5 
Estonian United Left Party 2.9 1.3 
Free Party 14.3 17.8 
Party of People’s Unity 4.0 3.1 
Social Democratic Party 14.3 14.0 
Union of Pro Patria and Res Publica 14.3 15.3 
Independent 1.4 1.3 
 Duncan index = 0.06 
Constituency  
1. Tallinn: Haabersti, Põhja-Tallinn, Kristiine 9.3 11.2 
2. Tallinn: Kesklinn, Lasnamäe, Pirita 11.6 9.1 
3. Tallinn: Mustamäe, Nõmme 8.1 7.6 
4. Harjumaa (exc. Tallinn), Raplamaa 13.2 12.2 
5. Hiiumaa, Läänemaa, Saaremaa 6.2 8.9 
6. Lääne-Virumaa 5.6 6.6 
7. Ida-Virumaa 7.0 7.4 
8. Järvamaa, Viljandimaa 7.0 7.6 
9. Jõgevamaa, Tartumaa (exc. Tartu) 7.7 7.1 
10. Tartu 8.0 6.9 
11. Võrumaa, Valgamaa, Põlvamaa 8.7 8.9 
12. Pärnumaa 7.6 6.6 
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Table 1. Who votes for EKRE? 
 EKRE vote 
Age 0.08 (0.12) 
Gender -0.61* (0.30) 
Education^  
Secondary 0.20 (0.50) 
Higher 0.88 (0.54) 
Identity 3.50* (1.47) 
Anti-immigration 0.24 (0.17) 
Euroscepticism 0.01 (0.05) 
Social conservatism 0.52** (0.19) 
Political mistrust 0.16* (0.08) 
Economic pessimism 0.21 (0.18) 
Employment type^^  
Part time employment (19-40h) 0.84 (0.60) 
Limited employment (1-19h) 1.48* (0.74) 
Irregular income 0.50 (0.66) 
Unemployed -0.40 (0.75) 
Income from benefits -0.36 (0.44) 
Campaign effort 0.56* (0.27) 
Locality -0.00 (0.01) 
Constant -10.50** (1.91) 
Observations 644 
Penalised log likelihood -132 
Note: standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.05, **p<0.01 
^ Reference category is primary education 



























Table 2. Predicted likelihood of voting for EKRE 







Social conservatism  
Socially liberal 3.3 
Socially conservative 12.6 
Political mistrust  
Complete trust 4.0 
Indifferent 8.1 
Complete mistrust 15.5 
Employment type  
Full time employment 10.0 
Limited employment (1-19h) 28.0 
Campaign effort  
No effort (€0 per candidate) 6.7 
Average effort (€1,000 per candidate) 10.7 
High effort (€2,000 per candidate) 16.4 
 
